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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
Karen M. Blum'
Honorable George C. Pratt.
Shifting gears here, I would like to turn our attention to municipal
liability. We will hear first from Professor Karen Blum. Karen is
a professor from Suffolk University Law School in Boston. Karen.
Professor Karen Blwn:
Judge, good afternoon. This presentation will briefly touch on the
four methods of establishing municipal liability under Section 1983
that have been recognized by the courts.
The first two methods are relatively untroublesome. In the first
circumstance, the plaintiff asserts that an officially adopted rle,
regulation, or policy (usually it is a written rule or policy) is
unconstitutional. It is settled that the first application of that policy
can be attributed to the municipality for liability purposes under
Section 1983. This is exemplified by the Monell' case, where the
Department of Social Services and the Board of Education in New
York had a written, formal policy requiring pregnant employees to
stop working at a certain time, even if it was not medically
necessary.2 That policy was found to be unconstitutional and the
City could be held liable for that official policy.3
There are a number of cases, especially in the Seventh Circuit,
which have held that a local government's mere enforcement of
State law as opposed to incorporation or adoption of State law into
local regulations or codes, is not sufficient to establish Monell
liability.4 Thus, them are some cases where the local officials will
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., 1968, Wells
College; J.D., 1974, Suffolk University; L.L.M., 1976, Harvard University.
'See generally Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of New York,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).2 1d. at 658.
3 1d. at 693.
4 See Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788, 793
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come in and say, "All we are doing is merely enforcing a State law
that we are required to enforce. "'
A recent case along the same lines out of the Seventh Circuit is
Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services v. Leean.6 The Seventh
Circuit makes the point that when the municipality is acting under
compulsion of state or federal law, it is the policy contained in that
law, rather than anything devised or adopted by the municipality,
that is responsible for the injury.' In such cases, the courts will
generally say that the state of mind of the local officials who
enforce or comply with the state or federal regulations is immaterial
on the question of whether the local government is violating the
Constitution, if the local officials could not act otherwise without
violating the state or federal law. This would make an effective
argument for a practitioner who is defending a local entity where
this kind of situation exists, but one must be careful.
In a case out of the Eleventh Circuit,8 defendants argued that they
were merely enforcing a state court injunction. Therefore, since it
was State law and not local law, the county or city should not be
held responsible. What the local officials were doing was enforcing
a state court injunction that prohibited certain anti-abortion
protesters from being within the "buffer zone." 9 The court said
that these local officials went beyond enforcing the terms of the
state court injunction."1 In fact, what they did was arrest all of the
anti-abortion protesters found within this "buffer zone," including
persons not named in the injunction. 1 So, when one goes beyond
or in some way adapts or modifies the state law injunction, rule, or
whatever it may be, it then becomes one's own policy.
aff'd, 882 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a county's incarceration of
a parolee without making independent finding as to validity of his incarceration
could not provide a basis for Section 1983 liability where the county acted
according to its duties under state law and had no duty or authority to
determine the validity of the parolee's confinement).
5 See, e.g., Surplus Store, 928 F.2d at 793.
6 154 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 1998).
7 1d. at 718.
' See, e.g., McKusick v. City of Mellboume, 96 F.3d 478 (11th Cir. 1996).
9 1d. at 481.
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City officials met with a similar fate on remand in Garner v.
Memphis Police Department,12 a case that went to the Supreme
Court on the use of deadly force." Garner involved a state statute
that authorized the shooting of fleeing felons."4 When the case
returned to the Sixth Circuit, the only defendant left in the suit was
the City of Memphis. Since the law regarding the shooting of
fleeing felons had not been clearly established at the time, the
individual police officers successfully escaped liability on qualified
immunity grounds. The State was protected by the Eleventh
Amendment.
The City argued that this was a state statute authorizing the
shooting of fleeing felons.15 Thus, it was not the City's policy but
the State's policy, and the City should not be liable.' 6 The court
disagreed, finding that the City made a conscious choice to adopt
and adapt the state policy.17 In fact, the City's policy was more
restrictive than the State's policy."' The State allowed the shooting
of any fleeing felon. 9 The City only allowed the shooting of
certain fleeing felons, but unfortunately for the City, an unarmed
fleeing burglar happened to be in this category." As a result, it
became the City's policy.2'
Another case Caminero v. Rand presents a detailed discussion of
the distinction between cases in which the City is merely enforcing
state law, as opposed to cases where the City has somehow
adopted, incorporated, or made that law its own policy.'
12 8 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1993).
13 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
141d. at 4.
" Gamer, 8 F.3d at 360. A Tennessee statute provided that '[if, after notice
of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flees or forcibly resists, the
officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.' TENb.CODE
AN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
16 id.
17 Id. at 364.
18 Id. at 360.
19 Id.
2 id.
21 Id. at 364.
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Where there is no written or officially adopted rule, regulation, or
policy, a second method of establishing municipal liability is to
point to an unconstitutional custom or practice that has the force of
law. These cases assume that the policy makers are on actual or
constructive notice of this practice or custom. If the practice or
custom is unconstitutional, then the City itself should be held
responsible under Section 1983 for the resulting constitutional
violations.
A case in this category that involves jail strip searches is Gary v.
Sheahan. 4 In Gary, there was a custom of routinely strip searching
women in the receiving room upon returning from court."
However, men were not routinely subjected to such searches.2" The
reason for this disparity was simply because there were so many
male prisoners as opposed to relatively fewer female prisoners.
Moreover, the prison did not have the staff nor the facility to
perform searches on the male prisoners. ' Therefore, the prison
developed the custom or practice of routinely searching the women
who came back from court, but not the men." The fact that such a
policy is not a written policy, or indeed conflicts with a written
statement of policy, does not defeat the plaintiff's claim that such a
policy existed.2 9 In other words, the City will not protect itself by
having something in writing that says "this is our policy", if in fact
the custom or practice is quite to the contrary.
Similarly, in Thomas v. District of Colwnbia,3" the defendants
argued that there was no practice or custom of permitting sexual
harassment or assault, because the District had a rule expressly
prohibiting intimate relations between prison guards and inmates.3
However, according to the court, the fact that the District had a rule
that prohibited the conduct did not relieve the District of liability
2 No. 96 C 7294, 1998 WL 547116 (N.D. III. August 20, 1998) (not
reported).
2Id. at *1.
6 Id. at *2.
27 Id.
28 id.
29 Id. at *5.
30 887 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
31 Id. at 5.
[Vol 151538
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where such a pattern of violations existed. 2 The pattern of
violations would in fact be the practice or custom, if the plaintiff
proves such a pattern.33
The third method of establishing local government liability is
somewhat more troublesome. This method, as established in City
of Canton v. Hanis, 4 is based on a failure to train, supervise, or
discipline. Under City of Canton, the liability of the City is
derivative and involves a situation where there has been an
underlying constitutional violation by a non-policy-making
employee,35 such as a constitutional violation committed by the
officer on the street.36 The question becomes whether the City can
be held liable under Section 1983 for the underlying constitutional
violation that has been committed.
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court held that a city (city,
county, or any local government entity) can be held liable under
Section 1983 where the policy is not itself unconstitutional, but
where the City can be shown to be deliberately indifferent to the
likelihood that non-policy making employees are going to commit
constitutional violations.37 In other words, the policy that the
plaintiff points to is a failure to train, some kind of inadequate
training, or failure to discipline or supervise. Since this, in itself,
may not be unconstitutional, the plaintiff must link that policy to the
underlying constitutional violation that has been committed by the
officer.
38
That is the challenge that is presented in the City of Canton genre
of cases, and the Supreme Court has said that the causal link can be
made by establishing that the City was "deliberately indifferent" to
the likelihood that these constitutional violations would occur.39 City
of Canton refers to objective deliberate indifference, that the policy
makers knew or should have known that by failing to train in this
3 id.
3Id. at 6.
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area or by failing to supervise or discipline, the constitutional
violation was going to be the consequence.4" How does a plaintiff
show deliberate indifference under City of Canton? There are two
methods that the courts have mentioned.
One method is the "obviousness" approach, where the plaintiff
points to an area in which it is immediately obvious that training is
necessary. If the appropriate training is not given, a constitutional
problem is inevitable and a constitutional violation will result. For
example, if police officers are given guns and they have the power
to arrest felons, then they should be given some training on the
constitutional limits on the use of deadly force. If the officers are
not trained, then the first time there is a wrongful shooting, the city
is going to have a problem. This is an area where there is an
obvious need for some training from the start. There is no need for
plaintiff to demonstrate a pattern or a custom if it is an
"obviousness" kind of case.
The second method of establishing the requisite deliberate
indifference is based on constructive notice. The need for training
in the area or discipline in the matter may not have been obvious up
front, but if there is a pattern of constitutional violations being
committed by a municipality's officers in the same kinds of
situations, at some point, there must be a realization that something
must be done about the problem. If nothing is done about it, and if
reasonable steps are not taken after this pattern of constitutional
violations develops, then there will be liability under City of
Canton.41
On the "obviousness" cases, one thing that plaintiffs must be
careful of is that the constitutional violation not be too obvious. In
Walker v. City of New York, 42 the plaintiffs made a claim that there
was deliberate indifference in failing to train police officers not to
commit perjury in court.43 The court said that everybody knows
40 Id. at 389.
41 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
42 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992). In Walker, the plaintiff spent 19 years in
prison, after being convicted based upon the perjured testimony of police
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that one should not commit perjury in court.' The reasoning goes
as- follows: if the violation is that obvious, then it was not the
failure to train the officers that caused the problem; officers, even
without training, should know that perjury is not right. On the
other hand, the court mentioned that if there had been a pattern of
officers testifying falsely, that might present a different situation.'5
There are also a number of cases, many of them involving
correctional guards sexually assaulting inmates and police officers
raping suspects, where the courts have determined that it was not a
failure to train that caused the underlying constitutional violation.'
One of the "obviousness" cases which is of particular interest is
Tazioly v. City of Philadelphia47 which involved case workers. In
Tazioly, a child was initially taken from the home and was put back
into the home with a drug addicted mother, which resulted in the
child being killed.4" The court found that given the nature of the
duties assigned to case workers, the need for training and
supervision is obvious, such that an inadequacy in this regard is
4Id. at 299-300.
45Id.
"See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998)
("Even if the courses concerning gender issues and inmates' right were less
than adequate, we are not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a
deficient training program would be the sexual assault of inmates. Specific or
extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to kmow that sexually
assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior."); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d
1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996) ("In light of the regular law enforcement duties of
a police officer, we cannot conclude that there was a patently obvious need for
the city to specifically train officers not to rape young women."). See also
Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 457 n.14 (1st Cir. 1998) ("There has been
no showing that whatever training was not provided to Grayson could have
thwarted any such purposeful discrimination. Whereas law enforcement
training might inform an officer about the proper methods to be used in
mediating and diffusing crimes of domestic violence, for example, it does not
necessarily follow that an officer intent on discriminating against a particular
class of crime victims would be deterred from doing so by 'enlightenment'
training, especially given the contraindications implicit in plaintiffs' other
evidence that the challenged decision-making by Grayson resulted from alcohol
abuse, or personal animosity toward individuals.").
47 No. CIV.A.97-CV-1219, 1998 WL 633747, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 10,
1998) (unreported).
4 Id. at *7.
7
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very likely to result in a violation of the child's constitutional
rights.4 9 Thus, the Department of Human Services' policy makers
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
consequences of employing untrained, overworked and
unsupervised case workers.-s
Another case where the potential for constitutional violations was
not as obvious is Guseman v. Martinez.51 In this case, the plaintiff
decedent was put in a prone restraint and subsequently died because
of it.12 The district court found that it was not so obvious that using
this kind of a restraint technique could result in death, such that it
called for a policy or training up front. In other words, there had
been no pattern of people dying from positional asphyxiation in this
particular area, and there were no known court decisions finding
that the use of prone restraint techniques was a violation of a
person's constitutional rights. Therefore, the court held that it was
not an area where there was an obvious need for training up front.13
In each of the constructive notice cases, there has been some kind
of pattern demonstrated to put the municipality on notice that there
was a problem. '  In Henry v. County of Shasta,"5 post-event
evidence was held to be admissible to show a pattern and notice.
The lawsuit was filed on the basis of the municipality's policy of
stripping and detaining people who had been stopped for traffic
tickets and throwing them into a rubber room for ten hours. The
49 Id. at *14.
5 Id.
51 1 F. Supp.2d 1240 (D. Kan. 1998).
52 /d. at 1251.
53 Id. at 1261. This case can be compared with the results from Gutierrez v.
City of San Antonio. In Gutierrez, the Court was addressing the constitutionality
of "hog tying" in the context of disposing of the qualified immunity defense
raised by the individual defendants. The Court said that it was clearly established
that the use of hog-tying could result in death, that it was a use of deadly force
and that there should have been some policy or training as to the use of hog-tying.
Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 445-51 (5th Cir. 1998).
54 See, e.g., Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.
1989); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994); Bordanaro v.
McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989).
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municipality obviously continued to do it because there were two
post event reports filed in addition to complaints filed by people
after the fact. Therefore, the municipality was not only put on
notice constructively, but also the municipality actually had a
lawsuit filed against it, and the municipality still continued to do
this.
5 6
The jail suicide cases raise both obvious kinds of training
problems as well as constructive notice kinds of training problems.
These cases are very difficult, not because of the municipal liability
issue, but generally because there is a problem showing the
underlying constitutional Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth
Amendment violation. In order to do so, one must first show
actual, subjective knowledge that the person was suicidal or that
there was a serious risk and a failure to take any reasonable steps to
abate the risk. These cases appear to be very difficult for plaintiffs
to prove.
The fourth method of establishing local government liability is by
pointing to a final policy maker who has made a decision or
committed an act that has resulted in a constitutional violation. The
Bryan County case57 and some post Bryan County cases should be
discussed in this context. Bryan County ties together issues of Oty
of Canton, in an inadequate screening/hiring context, and issues
raised in the final policy maker attribution cases."
Bryan County involved a county sheriff who hired his nephew's
son, Bums, as a deputy reserve," despite the young man's long rap
sheet. Since Bums had no felonies, he could be and was hired
under the state law.6 Two weeks later, he broke a woman's knee
caps while removing her from a truck.6 There was little question
5 MId. at 514.
' Board of the County Comm'r of Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382
(1997).
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
S ee, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989);
Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
6' 117 S. Ct. at 1387.
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that there had been an underlying constitutional violation, such as a
Fourth Amendment use of excessive force. The issue was whether
the county could be held liable under Section 1983 for that
violation, on the theory that the county sheriff, who all conceded to
be the final policy maker for the county on matters of law
enforcement, made a single bad hiring decision.63 Thus, the
questions were: (1) Whether a single bad hiring decision by a final
policy maker was sufficient to establish county liability? and (2)
Whether there was the requisite deliberate indifference reflected in
this decision under City of Canton?
On the question of whether a single decision by a final policy
maker can establish municipal liability, the Court answered yes, but
pointed out that in all of the cases where it has held that a single
decision by a policy maker or policy-making body has been
sufficient to establish liability, the policy maker has either directly
committed the constitutional violation himself or ordered the
constitutional violation to be committed.
For example, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,4 the county
sheriff ordered the police to break down the door, and go into the
clinic to get the witnesses when the police had capiases for the
witnesses but no warrant to enter the premises.' This conduct was
subsequently held to violate the Constitution,1 and, while the
individual officials were protected by qualified immunity, the
conduct of the final policy maker was attributed to the County.
In two other cases, Owen v. City of Independence67 and City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 68 local legislative bodies were
making administrative decisions that fired people or cancelled
concerts. In these situations, constitutional violations were directly
committed. The difference in Bryan County was that the county
sheriff engaged in inadequate screening, which is not itself
unconstitutional. '9 The Court concluded in Bryan County that for
63 Id.
"4 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
6 Id.
69 See Sleagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
67 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
6'453 U.S. 247 (1981).
69Bryan County, 117 S. Ct. at 1387.
[Vol 151544
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these inadequate screening/bad hiring cases, the test is going to be a
very rigorous one."' What a plaintiff is going to have to prove is
that had this sheriff or policy maker in fact adequately screened the
background record of his nephew's son, that it would have been
"plainly obvious" that this particular constitutional violation would
have occurred.1 The majority of the Court in Bryan County did not
think there was anything in Bums' record that made it plainly
obvious that he was going to use excessive force on a suspect.Y
What must be considered is the particular background of the
applicant in question.73
It is helpful to look at some post-Bryan County cases. In Barney
v. PuLsipher,74 the court said that the focus of the inquiry, in
determining when a single poor hiring decision is sufficient to
constitute deliberate indifference, appears to be on the actual
background of the individual applicant, rather than the thoroughness
or adequacy of the municipality's review of the application itself.7
Barney involved a correctional guard who sexually assaulted several
inmates. The court said there was nothing in this guard's
background (he had been arrested for possession of alcohol at age
seventeen and had several speeding tickets)76 that would have
indicated he would have committed sexual assault on the inmates.
There are some recent cases where courts have found the Bryan
County standard satisfied in the bad hiring context. Doe I v.
Board of Education of Consolidated School District" involved a
teacher who had been rehired after there had been complaints that
he had had an affair with a student. The court held that the officials
of the school had known that the teacher had been previously
70 Id. at 1389.
71 Id. at 1392.
72 Id. at 1393.
73 Id.
74 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
75 Id. at 1308.
76 Id.; see also Snyder v. Trepagniev, 142 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1998)
(claim that City's screening policies were inadequate failed Bryan County test
where officer had admitted to two nonviolent offenses which would not have
made use of excessive force "plainly obvious"), cert. granted on other
grounds, 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999).
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involved with another student. When the school rehired him, it was
predictable that he might repeat his wrongful behavior.78
In Raby v. Baptist Medical Center,79 a police officer, who had
been fired from the department after complaints of aggressive
behavior was hired by the Medical Center as a security guard."
Plaintiff demonstrated that the hiring personnel knew of the
officer's background and of the history of his aggressions." In
Raby, plaintiff complained of the use of excessive force by the
security guard. The court concluded that the plaintiff's evidence
was sufficient to satisfy the Bryan County causal connection
requirement and to establish the deliberate indifference of the
Medical Center to the plainly obvious consequences of hiring this
officer.
While the Bryan County "plainly obvious consequence" test may
be a stringent one for plaintiffs to meet, these recent cases make it
clear that the standard is not insurmountable.
7' Id. at 960-61.
79 21 F. Supp.2d 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
so Id. at 1352.
"I Id. at 1353; see also Kesler v. King, 29 F. Supp.2d 356, 369 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (decision to recommend the hiring of a former corrections officer who
had been convicted of beating an inmate created substantial risk that inmates'
right to be free from excessive force would be violated).
1546 [Vol 15
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